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ABSTRACT 
     As more and more transition coutries join the eurozone it is becoming reasonable to investigate what monetary 
policy might be most successful for countries prior to the introduction of the euro. One possible alternative is 
inflation targeting, which has found application in numerous economies in the last two decades, including the 
Visegrád Countries.  
     In this paper I am introducing some important aspects and an empirical examination of the monetary policy of the 
Visegrád Countries. I am providing an overview of previous empirical findings and trying to make some 
comparisons of new EU and recommendations for pre-accession countries, such as Croatia.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
     The catching-up process of Central European economies has always been followed by exquisite interest, the 
international literature abounds in analyses on the economies of the region, prepossessed by discussions on the 
subject of European integration. In the present paper I am introducing some aspects of the economic convergence 
process of the four Visegrád Countries over the past one and a half decades in such a monetary framework – known 
as inflation targeting – which has been adopted by various industrial and emerging countries since 1990 and has 
determined the preparation period for eurozone membership of the countries under examination. This paper focuses 
on the period of the convergence process between 1990 and 2010 with special regard to the years after 1997, the first 
year of applying inflation targeting in Central Europe. 
     My investigation was spurred by two main objectives: the examination of (1) whether inflation targeting was a 
suitable strategy for the compliance with the price stability criterion of the Economic and Monetary Union for the 
Visegrád Countries and by the same token (2) whether inflation targeting provides better results than other monetary 
policy regimes applied by new EU member states before eurozone accession.  
     The future development of the four EU member states is largely influenced by their price and cost 
competitiveness which have so far proved to be reconcilable with the price stability goal and can even be supported 
by a well-defined monetary policy. The recent crisis of the system of financial intermediaries calls our attention to 
watchfully evaluate the real economic effects of the self-supporting central bank interventions and reconsider the 
timing of the pressing monetary union membership.  
II. THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY AND PRECEDING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS ON 
INFLATION TARGETING 
     According to the hypothesis of the study monetary policy conducted in the frames of inflation targeting has been 
more successful in supporting disinflation than other strategies based on monetary targeting or exchange targeting 
during the convergence process of Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, it is presumed that those 
countries where budgetary deficit assumed above average proportions since EU accession have been less successful 
in anchoring inflationary expectations, moreover, the choice of exchange regime can influence the effectiveness of 
antiinflationary policy. 
     Research results on the effectiveness of inflation targeting have shown a diverse picture in the economic 
literature. Hu (2003) and Wu (2004) justified that inflation targeting among developed OECD countries proved to be 
overperforming any other monetary policy in both curbing inflation and even in safeguarding a balanced growth for 
the real economy. The examination of Mishkin-Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), in contrast, failed to shore up arguments for 
IT-countries (IT: inflation targeting) reaching outstanding results in arresting inflation. In their view the performance 
of these countries have simply gone through a similar disinflationary process as was typical of most industrialised 
countries in the 90s. Nevertheless, there is a broad group of experts who agree that inflation targeting has delivered 
extra gains in anchoring inflationary expectations, which is manifested in both the level and volatility of inflation. 
Concerning the prerequisites of an auspicious application according to Truman (2003), Batini-Laxton (2005). 
 Schaeter and al. (2002) the lack of fiscal discipline, adequate econometric models for forecasting inflation, and 
advanced financial markets can not be reconciled with the IT strategy. Celasun-Gelos-Prati (2004) emphasised that 
fiscal consolidation is of key importance for emerging countries to be able to bear down inflationary expectations. 
At the same time Batini-Laxton (2005) established that the applicability of the IT-system does not surmise a 
rigorous set of criteria, thus emerging economies can adopt it in case they define appropriate institutional and 
technical goals. Novák (2009) investigating a panel of developed OECD and emerging Central European IT-
countries came to the conclusion that inflation targeting contributed to decreasing the persistance of inflation in both 
group of countries, though in Central European countries credibility deficiencies in economic (above all fiscal) 
policy and the inflexibility of foreign exchange policy often distorted the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
III. INFLATION TARGETING AND NOMINAL CONVERGENCE IN THE VISEGRÁD COUNTRIES 
     After the repeal of official exchange rates and foreign exchange controls the Visegrád Countries first applied a 
world currency as nominal anchor (German Mark, US dollar) in their foreign exchange policy and later adopted an 
exchange rate regime bound to the euro. A sooner or later shift to a floating exchange rate environment was also 
made to enable market forces to operate more efficiently in the economy. This latter contributed to a better 
applicability of the inflation targeting monetary strategy adopted with different timing and reference values by the 
four countries (Table 1). 
 
     Inflation targeting, based on a medium-term inflation target announced by the central bank, enhanced central 
bank accountability and transparency, a wide range of economic analysis for forecasting inflation, is a monetary 
policy strategy which enables the use of discretionary elements. Monetary policy in this system follows the inflation 
target as ultimate goal expressed as the level or an interval of the annual change in the consumer price index and the 
inflation forecast serves as intermediate target usually supplemented by an interest rate operational objective. 
Inflation targeting, even if having no strict system of criteria, can only be effective if the inflation target is credible, 
and the whole government dedicates itself to anti-inflationary policy (Neményi, 2008). A broad political consensus 
between the central bank and the actors of the economy can lead to a better anchoring of inflationary expectations 
contributing to a successful disinflation process. 
      
     Among transition economies the Czech Republic was the first to introduce the above system and has ever since 
been reckoned among the most successful appliers among emerging economies. In addition, it defined a specific 
inflation measure net of the effect of administrative prices and indirect taxes. The outstanding performance of the 
Czech Republic in inflation targeting was due to the strict provisions on central bank independence, the fiscal 
discipline of the government and that all monetary policy goals were subordinated to price stability which enhanced 
the credibility of central bank measures. (Horská, 2001) 
     Poland started inflation targeting under an unstable financial situation with inflation overreaching 10% and under 
the less flexible crawling peg regime. Poland – just like Slovakia and Hungary – uses the consumer price index as 
inflation indicator for policy implementation. The shift to the new system was not crowned by such a great success 
as in the Czech Republic at the beginning as simultaneous exchange policy objectives and the less stringent fiscal 
policy measures impeded the disinflation process, nevertheless, since the adoption of a more flexible exchange 
regime Poland has also made a significant progress. (Horská, 2001) 
     Slovakia started targeting inflation implicitly in 1998 and announced an explicit medium target after 2004. 
Slovakia, therefore, has a very short experience in the monetary strategy discussed above and followed a rather 
mixed approach with due regard to exchange rate stability and all policy goals set in a way that best served the 
preparation for eurozone membership. 
     The evaluation of Hungary’s monetary policy in the last ten years raises disputable questions. Until 2004 foreign 
exchange policy stabilisation distracted the attention of monetary decision makers from focusing on the announced 
inflation target. Furthermore, the rather lax fiscal policy between 2002 and 2006 also decelerated the nominal 
convergence. (Neményi, 2008).   
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Inflation targeting regime in the monetary policy of the CEECs
1 
Country Inflation target 
 Progress Percentage rate  
Czech Republic 1997: introduction of the regime 1998: 5,5-6,5, 1999:4-5, 2000: 3,5-4,5, 2001: 2-
4, 2002-2005: 1-3, 2006: below 3, 2007: 2  
Poland 1998: introduction of the regime 
1998-2003: objective: reducing the 
rate of inflation 
2003-: targeting inflation at a 2,5  1% 
2003: 3-1 
after 2003: 2,5  1 
Hungary 2001: introducing inflation targeting  
 
2002: 4,5  1, 2003: 3,5  1, 
2004: 3,5  1, 2005: 4  1, 2006: 3, 2007:3  1 
Slovakia 1998-2005: implicit inflation targeting 
2005-: explicit inflation targeting 
2009: EMU membership 
2005: 3,5  0,5 
mid-term strategy: 2006: 2,5 
2007-2008: 2,0 
 
The Czech National Bank defined the inflation target as 2% for years beyond 2010, Hungary has been seeking to 
fulfil an inflation target of about 3% since 2006. Poland has committed itself to stabilise inflation at a constant 2,5  
1% level, whereas Slovakia made a successful accession to the EMU in the frames of inflation targeting in January 
2009. 
In the struggle to achieve an inflation rate close to the 2% reference value of the ECB, we can observe that in 
Hungary the disinflation process has slowed down between 2003-2005 and in Slovakia price deregulation and tax 
harmonisation caused problems in the pursuit of the monetary policy to curb inflation in the first years of the 
operation of the new system. The Czech Republic and Poland has all in all followed a successful antiinflationary 
policy. As for the exchange rate system, the Czech Republic, Poland has had a floating exchange rate regime in the 
last as it were ten years, whereas Slovakia joined the ERM II. at the end of 2005 and managed its foreign exchange 
policy in this regime before the adoption of the euro. Hungary started independent float in 2008 after keeping the 
exchange rate against the euro within a 15% band around a central parity. As a general tendency it is conspicuous 
that these countries have moved towards a more flexible exchange rate regime in the last years which has enabled 
focusing on inward stabilisation and does not necessitate such a great stock of foreign currency reserves.  
 
Table 2: CPI Inflation rates in the CEECs 1990-2006 
Year Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
1990-1994 52 249,3 32,2 58,3 
1995 9,1 27,8 28,3 7,2 
1996 8,8 19,9 23,5 5,8 
1997 8,5 15 18,5 6 
1998 10,7 11,8 14,2 6,7 
1999 2,1 7,2 10 10,4 
2000 3,9 10,1 10 12,2 
2001 
2002 
4,7 
1,8 
5,3 
1,9 
9,1 
5,2 
7,2 
3,5 
2003 -0,1 0,7 4,7 8,5 
2004 2,6 3,6 6,8 7,4 
2005 1,6 2,2 3,5 2,8 
2006 
2007 
2,1 
3,0 
1,3 
2,6 
4,0 
7,9 
4,3 
1,9 
Source: NBC, NBS, NBP, MNB 
 
After the system change the fall in inflation was spectacular in the transition economies (especially in Poland after a 
hyperinflation of over 100% at the beginning of the 90’s to less than 30% by 1995) as price deregulation started and 
hidden inflation became revealed. Even after 2000 the disinflation process can generally be appraised as expeditious 
for all the Visegrád Countries (Table 2) which was largely influenced by the way inflation targeting was realised. 
The system change was followed by a gradual rise of consumer prices and the change of relative prices, in which the 
 dissolution of administrative prices and indirect tax reforms played an important role. The four countries under 
examination belong to the frontline of the world concerning central bank independence which might have been 
partly due to the requirements of inflation targeting in relation to central bank transparency and accountability 
(Beblavy, 2003). In countries where monetary policy commitment was supported by a disciplined fiscal policy, 
antiinflationary policy proved to be even more successful. Concerning inflationary expectations the Czech economic 
actors seem to react in the most flexible way to permanent external shocks among the four countries, the inflation 
inertia (persistence) in the Czech Republic the behaviour of economic actors is comparable to that in Germany and 
Austria (CNB 2007, MNB 2008). In contrast, economic agents in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary can still be 
characterised with somewhat backward-looking price expectations but the level and volatility of inflation has 
significantly slackened since the introduction of inflation targeting (Figure 1-2). The same goes for Romania 
following the system since mid 2005. 
 
Figure 1-2: The average and the standard deviation of inflation before and after the introduction of inflation 
targeting (Romania as control country with data since 2000)  
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Source: IMF IFS, own calculation based on quarterly statistics 
 
As regards fiscal processes it is easy to prove that three out of the four countries had met the 60%/GDP state debt 
criterion by 2006 but Hungary and Poland failed to cut budgetary deficit to a satisfactory extent so as to reach the 
3% limit by the same year and debt dynamics have accelerated (reaching 80% in Hungary by 2011). Both Hungary 
and Poland could successfully eliminate a part of the inherited state debt after transition due to the privatisation of 
state-owned companies bearing large debts and the release of part of the external debt in the case of Poland. The 
lack of a general structural reform and less resources from privatisation revenues, however, entailed an increase in 
state debt and budgetary deficit in the years between 2000 and 2006 (Appendix 1-2.)
2 
IV. THE QUESTION OF EUROZONE MEMBERSHIP 
From the point of view of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria Slovakia showed the best results in 2007 and 2008 (Table 
3) which is not surprising as among the four countries only Slovakia joined the EMU in January 2009. As a 
consequence of the successful financial stabilisation in the last ten years, all the four countries have got closer to the 
eurozone average in respect of the convergence criteria but since 2007 there has been a slight halt in the nominal 
convergence process which was followed by the deterioration of economic performance owing to the global 
financial crisis forcing fiscal policy decision-makers to launch crisis management packages. 
 
Table 3: Convergence criteria in 2008-2010 
Country 
Inflation (%) 
(HICP) 
Budgetary 
balance (GDP%) 
State debt 
(GDP %) 
Long-term interest 
rate (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Czech 
Republic 
6,3 0,6 0,3 -2,7 -5,9 -5,7 30 35,4 39,8 4,6 4,8 4,7 
Poland 4,0 4,2 3,9 -3,7 -7,1 -7,3 47,2 51 53,9 6,1 6,1 6,1 
Slovakia 3,9 0,9 0,7 -2,1 -8 -7,9 27,8 35,4 41 4,7 4,7 3,9 
Hungary 6,0 4,0 4,8 -3,8 -4 -4,1 72,9 78,3 78,9 8,2 9,1 8,4 
 Reference 
value* 
3,2%  1%   -3   60 6,5  6,0% 
Source: Eurostat, ECB 
Comment: On the basis of the 2008-2010 ECB convergence reports 
 
Hungary counts to the least disciplined member states of the EU regarding budgetary processes and slightly also 
lagged behind in diminishing price level growth until 2008 partly on account of the backward-looking nature of 
inflationary expectations and the less favourable fiscal processes. Furthermore, the implementation of corrective 
fiscal measures seems to be inevitable, as since the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005 it is evident that 
new member states will not get any derogation concerning the fiscal criteria (Orbán-Szapáry, 2004).  
 The globalisation of international financial markets has made the domestic currency of small, open economies 
vulnerable as a consequence of sudden capital in- and outflows, the issue of eurozone integration therefore emerges 
from time to time as an urgent question. 
The summary of the various central bank examinations enables the comparison of the costs and benefits of 
abandoning the substantive monetary policy and choosing the eurozone membership instead. (Table 4). The data 
below were predicted on the basis of the enlargement of external trade by approximately 75% after accession to the 
EMU (within a period of about 20 years) which can not be underpinned according to the eurozone tendencies 
experienced so far. (MNB 2008). Among the expected consequences of EMU-membership above all the reduction in 
transaction costs are worth emphasising bringing advantages for the companies operating in the real sphere (as 
financial institutions fall short of some of their revenue because of the same reason). 
The benefits from introducing the common currency principally affect trade in the long run. The equalization of 
interest rates to be expected in the future can still contribute to the reduction in the level of rates through the 
decrease in the interest premia. Notwithstanding, it can also be presumed that the sudden drop in interest rates can 
lead to an overheated economy and further indebtedness, as it was observed in the case of some earlier eurozone 
members (e.g.: Portugal). (MNB 2008) 
 
Table 4: The advantages and disadvantages of eurozone membership 
Country 
The decrease in 
transaction+ 
administrative 
costs and foreign 
exchange risk 
(one-time effect 
on the level of 
GDP) 
The long-
term  
effect of the 
decrease 
 in interest 
rates 
The increase of 
external  
trade and other  
long-term 
effects 
(annual GDP 
growth) 
The cost of 
 lost 
seigniorage 
 and other 
income 
Effects of 
disinflation or 
higher than 
before inflation 
Czech Republic 
Comparable  
to the other 
countries  
The joint effect of the two factors 
would have enhanced GDP by 
1,68% in the case of eurozone 
accession in 2006 + 
a 1,4% annual saving for 
enterprises because of the decrease 
in exchange rate risk 
-0,86% for 
enterprises 
1-3% 
real 
appreciation 
Poland 
0,14+0,07 
% 
-(150-200) 
basis points 
+ 0,35-0,77% 
GDP growth 
n.a. 
the decrease in 
GDP growth by a 
0,3-0,8%. 
during two years 
Slovakia 0,3+0,05+0,02% 
0,5-1% point 
decrease in 
interest 
rates 
 
+ 0,4-1% GDP 
growth 
-0,03% one-
time+ 
-0,04% annual 
1,5%  
greater inflation 
 Hungary 
+(0,11-0,22) 
+0,08 
% 
+ 0,08-0,13 % 
GDP growth 
+ 0,55-0,76% 
GDP growth 
-0,17-0,23% - 
Source: Research Centre, Mendel University (2007), Borowski et al. (2004), NBS (2004), Csajbók-Csermely (2002) 
V. PANEL REGRESSION: METHODS AND RESULTS 
I tested the statistical goodness of the inflation targeting monetary strategy relying for the Visegrád group and a 
control group on the basis of an analysing study of Wu (2004) with the help of the regression equations included in 
the same supplemented by various indicators influencing the rate of inflation (current account balance, relative price 
changes, the expansion of domestic consumption) with an econometric model estimation.  
The basic equation used for estimating quarterly inflation was as follows: 
ittittiit
TCD 431210    (1) 
 
The dependent variable in the equation was the quarterly inflation rate (consumer pricel level increase compared to 
the corresponding period of the previous year) measured in the selected countries (πit), the explanatory variables are 
the following: a dummy variable reflecting the policy choice of the country (with a value of 1 if the country is 
inflation targeter and 0 if not) a one-period lagged quarterly inflation variable 1t . The C  variable compresses 
the country-specific, whereas the T  variable the periodically different (time-specific) variables which are common 
for all the countries (and thus might be corresponded to supply-shock inflation), and  is the error term. (The i  
index denotes the particular countries and the t  index stands for the given quarter of a year. If the 2  parameter 
takes a value between 0 and 1 it indicates that the inflation rate follows a stationary autoregressive process with 
regression toward the mean. Alternative ways of filling in the C variable is using public (household) consumption to 
GDP ratio, trade balance or current account balance as percentage of GDP (as most countries in Central Europe have 
an outstanding economic openness the change in these variables can well reflect demand shocks), variables 
measuring government spending (expenditure or deficit to GDP), or the change in dual productivity capturing the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect of relative price dynamics in the tradable and non-tradable sector. Instead of using the 
consumption/GDP variable most studies recommend an approximation of the output gap (see e.g. Ball-Sharidon 
(2003)) for accounting for the Phillips-curve effect. An estimation on the output gap and dual productivity, however, 
exceed the present scope of research as emerging countries have very limited and fragmentary time series. Ball and 
Sharidon (2003) assign the relative price change of international commodity price index as the variable under T, 
denoting external, time-variant effect, which I also adopt in the regression.  
I used the same approach in a preceding study comparing OECD countries including Visegrád Countries. which 
were all inflation targeters in 2009 (Novák, 2009). The panel regression presented in this study extended to 14 
countries (12 new EU member states since 2004 and two countries – Croatia and Turkey – on the waiting list for EU 
accession). For an appraisal of the choice of monetary policy I use a control group for the panel estimation 
consisting of the Baltic countries, South-Eastern European countries and the rest of the Central Eastern European 
countries (see Appendix III.) Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have maintained a currency board since the beginning of 
the transition period (Estonia then entered in EMU in 2011), Bulgaria has followed the same strategy since 1997. 
Slovenia operated exchange targeting before joining the eurozone in 2007. Cyprus and Malta set explicit exchange 
targets before adopting the euro in 2009 and Croatia maintains a quasi-fixed exchange regime bound to the euro. 
The rest of the countries (Visegrád Countries, Romania and Turkey) are inflation targeters. I compared the 
inflationary process before and after introducing inflation targeting for the whole sample and for the countries in the 
focus of the examination. I preserved the indicator of the quarterly inflation rate with a one-period lag from the 
original function of the model as well as the inflation targeting dummy, the statistical significance level of which 
formed the basis of the hypothesis examination. The variables of the original model for difference in difference 
estimation were replenished with variables of overriding sigfnificance and of processable time series, such as 
household consumption, trade balance, current account balance, government expenditure, supplemented with 
international commodity price indices. For the estimation of the regression equation obtained this way the necessary 
data were provided by the IMF IFS data basis for the period between 1990 and 2008. I adopted the indicators for 
 inflation targeting from the study of Batini-Laxton (2005) and various central bank report of the selected countries.  
The OLS regression results for the whole sample and time series is contained in Table 5 containing the most 
significant explanatory variables. The coefficient of the inflation rate with a one-period lag ( 2 ) is significant but 
less than one which shows decreasing presistence of inflation for the whole sample. The inflation targeting dummy 
can only be accepted at a 10% significance level, but has a uniformly negative sign in all regression estimates 
(containing different variables). Household consumption seems to account for a positive change in quarterly 
inflation rate as second most significant after the lagged inflation variable together with the trade balance having 
relatively strong explanatory power with an under 5% p value. 
Table 5: Pooled OLS for the CEECs quarterly inflation 
Included 14 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 39, maximum 86 
Dependent variable: pt 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
pt_1 0,780489 0,0190801 40,9059 <0,00001 *** 
D (it) -0,0810094 0,0466201 -1,7376 0,08263 * 
household_consumption 0,177892 0,0583047 3,0511 0,00235 *** 
trade balance 0,579346 0,242525 2,3888 0,01712 ** 
Mean dependent var  0,210420 S.D. dependent var  0,921651 
Sum squared resid  235,9412 S.E. of regression  0,522571 
R-squared  0,695519 Adjusted R-squared  0,694462 
F(4, 864)  493,4049 P-value(F)  2,4e-221 
Log-likelihood -666,3063 Akaike criterion  1340,613 
Schwarz criterion  1359,677 Hannan-Quinn  1347,908 
rho  0,391361 Durbin-Watson  1,203789 
 
Comparing the above results with that of Novák (2009) we can establish some interesting facts about the 1990-2010 
period inflation progress of the new EU countries. The before-crisis investigation revealed that the Visegrád 
Countries’ quarterly inflation strongly reacted to international commodity prices and the IT dummy was significant 
for the whole OECD sample and the Visegrád Countries (this was also proved by renewed regression on the period 
1990-2010, see Appendix IV.). Visegrád countries have gained disinflationary advantages from introducing the new 
regime and are strongly set out to international commodity price shocks due to their flexible exchange rates. At the 
same time the current investigation on new EU members (and two new future entrants) showed that countries 
pursuing an inflation targeting strategy might have some advantage compared to other new EU members in their 
price convergence but the significance level of the choice of monetary policy is doubtful, and therewith it is 
questionable whether countries having a floating regime (inflation targeting countries) are better-off during their 
preparation to eurozone as great fluctuations of exchange rates during turbulent financial periods might melt down 
the advantages of flexible exchange rate adjustment to fixed currency regimes. Raw material prices do not exercise 
strong influence on domestic inflation rates of the CEECs, trade balance shows a much stronger impact on the same. 
The relatively low R
2
 suggests that the inclusion of further parameters in the regression is worth considering as well 
as the application of an improved methodological solution because of the great number of the missing data for 
analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
     The disciplinatory power of the inflation criterion of the EMU definitely has a positive impact on the economic 
policy of countries that are in for joining the eurozone. During the period between 1994 and 2001 there was a trade-
off between economic growth and disinflation but following 2001 the Visegrád Four were able to sustain the pace of 
economic growth together with international competitiveness, manifested in the growing export activity in the 
frames of inflation targeting. The goals and instruments of monetary policy and fiscal policy should therefore be 
 defined in a way that best serves the price stability goal and facilitates the necessary development that the structural 
characteristics of the economy make desirable. 
     In the field of nominal convergence Slovakia proved to be the best performing economy which made it qualify 
for EMU membership in January 2009. In essence – apart from the case of Hungary – the Visegrad Countries 
managed to comply with the Maastricht criteria by 2007 (disregarding that only Slovakia has joined ERM II. by 
then). Hungary is somewhat lagging behind as it was not able to combat inflation to the required level for a longer 
period of time before 2008 and has continuously breached the fiscal dicipline criteria. The high level of inherited 
state debt, the discretionary fiscal policy measures in recent years, the backward-looking nature of economic actors’ 
inflationary expectations, and the barriers of the exchange policy have made it difficult to accomplish all nominal 
convergence conditions necessary for eurozone maturity. Since 2000 (till 2008) the currencies of the neighbouring 
economies constantly appreciated and as the exchange rate is the most important transmission channel of monetary 
policy, the price level convergence happened through the nominal exchange rate and not through a major excursion 
of the consumer price index.  
     Concerning real convergence – measuring it in GDP per capita terms – the Czech Republic enjoys precedence, 
whereas by now all the four countries have reached 50% of the eurozone per capita GDP at purchasing power parity. 
In the remaining period of economic adjustment price level growth and the accession of the welfare level will 
continue to go hand in hand, thus the price and cost competitiveness of the economy will get even more emphasis.  
     The inflation targeting monetary policy has proved to be the right choice for the Visegrád countries in the period 
1997-2008 and could be statistically proved, however, since 2008 the economic slowdown and financial instability 
in the four countries (especially Hungary thanks to its ambiguous fiscal processes) made it questionable whether this 
monetary regime due to its discretionary elements and more flexible operation can overperform other monetary 
regimes, or an alternative pegged currency system. In the case of Croatia and Turkey being future entrants of the EU 
it is therefore recommendable to render due attention to the right choice of the monetary regime and above all 
maintain a continuous communication with the public to better anchor inflationary expectations and create 
confidence in economic policy. 
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(a) Acknowledgements: For useful constructive comments and suggestions I am grateful to anonymus reviewers and 
B&ESI Conference Participants; all errors remain mine. 
APPENDIX 
State debt in the CEECs 1989-2007 
Year Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
1989 13,7 280,6 71,4 35,7 
1996 13,1  73,6 30,3 
1997 12,7  63,9 33 
1998 15  61,6 34 
1999 16 40,1 60,9 47,2 
2000 18,2 36,8 55,4 49,9 
2001 25,3 36,7 53,5 48,7 
2002 28,8 41,1 57,2 43,3 
2003 38,3 45,4 56,9 42,6 
2004 37,4 43,6 57,6 43,6 
2005 30,24 47,06 61,58 34,17 
2006 30,11 47,65 65,63 30,44 
2007 28,7 45,2 66,0 29,4 
Source: ESCB and European Commission 
 
Budgetary deficit in the CEECs 1992-2007 
Year Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovakia 
1992 n.a. n.a. -6,9 n.a. 
1996 -3,1 -3,6 -3,0 -7,4 
1997 -2,4 -4 -4,8 -6,2 
 1998 -5 -2,1 -4,6 -3,8 
1999 -3,6 -1,4 -3,9 -7,1 
2000 -3,7 -0,7 -3,0 -12,3 
2001 -5,9 -3,8 -4,4 -6 
2002 -6,8 -3,6 -9,2 -5,7 
2003 -11,7 -4,5 -6,2 -3,7 
2004 -3 -4,8 -4,5 -3,3 
2005 -3,54 -4,32 -7,78 -2,8 
2006 -2,94 -3,79 -9,21 -3,69 
2007 -1,6 -2,0 -5,5 -2,2 
Source: MNB, ESCB and European Commission 
 
Monetary regimes and the start of transition to inflation targeting 
Country Monetary regime 
Starting date of inflation 
targeting 
Bulgaria Currency Board - 
Croatia Exchange targeting - 
Czech Republic Inflation targeting The end of 1997 
Cypress Exchange targeting - 
Estonia Currency Board - 
Hungary Inflation targeting June 2001  
Latvia Currency Board - 
Lithuania Currency Board - 
Malta Exchange targeting - 
Poland Inflation targeting January 1999  
Romania Inflation targeting August 2005  
Slovenia Exchange targeting - 
Slovakia Inflation targeting The end of 2004 
Turkey Inflation targeting 2002 
 
Pooled OLS on the Visegrád Countries inflation regression 
using 258 observations, Included 4 cross-sectional units, Time-series length: minimum 63, maximum 66 
Dependent variable: pt 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
pt_1 0,914442 0,0175125 52,2166 <0,00001 *** 
it -0,00578055 0,00228731 -2,5272 0,01210 ** 
household_cons_ 0,00961333 0,00434439 2,2128 0,02780 ** 
nyersanyag_vila 0,0165731 0,00410208 4,0402 0,00007 *** 
Mean dependent var  0,071294  S.D. dependent var  0,062023 
Sum squared resid  0,046004  S.E. of regression  0,013458 
R-squared  0,979998  Adjusted R-squared  0,979762 
F(4, 254)  3111,250  P-value(F)  2,2e-214 
Log-likelihood  747,4399  Akaike criterion -1486,880 
Schwarz criterion -1472,668  Hannan-Quinn -1481,165 
rho  0,311980  Durbin-Watson  1,319877 
 
 ENDNOTES 
1. The table can be found in original in Wisniewski, A. “A visegrádi országok felkészültsége a GMU-csatlakozásra”, 
Közgazdasági Szemle, 2005/9. pp. 664-682. The original table has been updated on the basis of the information 
provided by the four central banks: CNB, NBP, NBS, MNB   
2. Data calculated according to ESA 95 since 2004. 
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